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Background: Cash transfer interventions are forms of social protection based on the provision of cash to
vulnerable households with the aim of reduce risk, vulnerability, chronic poverty and improve human capital. Such
interventions are already an integral part of the response to HIV/AIDS in some settings and have recently been
identified as a core element of World Health Organization’s End TB Strategy. However, limited impact evaluations
and operational evidence are currently available to inform this policy transition.
Discussion: This paper aims to assist national tuberculosis (TB) programs with this new policy direction by
providing them with an overview of concepts and definitions used in the social protection sector and by reviewing
some of the most critical operational aspects associated with the implementation of cash transfer interventions.
These include: 1) the various implementation models that can be used depending on the context and the public
health goal of the intervention; 2) the main challenges associated with the use of conditionalities and how they
influence the impact of cash transfer interventions on health-related outcomes; 3) the implication of targeting
diseases-affected households and or individuals versus the general population; and 4) the financial sustainability of
including health-related objectives within existing cash transfer programmes. We aimed to appraise these issues in
the light of TB epidemiology, care and prevention. For our appraisal we draw extensively from the literature on
cash transfers and build upon the lessons learnt so far from other health outcomes and mainly HIV/AIDS.
Conclusions: The implementation of cash transfer interventions in the context of TB is still hampered by important
knowledge gaps. Initial directions can be certainly derived from the literature on cash transfers schemes and other
public health challenges such as HIV/AIDS. However, the development of a solid research agenda to address
persisting unknowns on the impact of cash transfers on TB epidemiology and control is vital to inform and support
the adoption of the post-2015 End TB strategy.
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The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that
between 2000 and 2014, 43 million lives have been saved
as a result of effective tuberculosis (TB) diagnosis and
treatment [1]. Despite this, the decline in TB incidence
remains slow (1⋅5 % decrease in global estimated TB in-
cidence rates annually) contributing to the persistent
high global burden [1]. This slow decline suggests that a
biomedical approach will be not sufficient to end the TB
epidemic and achieve TB elimination in the near future.
There is increasing consensus that interventions tackling
the social determinants of TB may play an important
role in the fight against this disease [2, 3]. This vision is
reflected in WHO’s new, post-2015, End TB Strategy
which identifies universal health coverage, social protec-
tion and actions on social determinants as key elements
of the global response to TB. The strategy includes also
a target that no TB affected household should experi-
ence catastrophic costs due to TB [4].
Social protection has been defined as a range of pol-
icies that enable people to cope with and recover from
risks and adversities, with the objective of achieving pov-
erty reduction and sustainable and inclusive economic
growth [5]. A common form of social protection are
cash transfer schemes that provide cash to poorFig. 1 The role of cash transfer interventions in TB care, support and preve
potentially enable equitable access to TB services (TB care), mitigate TB rela
risk (TB prevention) through impact on living conditions and the expected
inadequate housing conditions, etc.). Cash transfer interventions can be TB-sp
The grey box shows examples of biomedical tools against TB included in thi
TB care and prevention at various stages of the causal pathway. Their inclusi
disciplinary response to TB based on an integrated biomedical and structurapopulation groups to reduce their vulnerability and im-
poverishment. Cash transfers can be given uncondition-
ally or conditionally. In this latter case, recipients are
required to take specific behavioural, education or health
actions prior to cash being transferred [6, 7]. Due to
their proven impact on human and financial capital
[6, 8–10], cash transfers are now an integral part of the
response to child malnutrition, maternal health, and
HIV/AIDS in many settings [11–14] and have been
hypothesised to contribute to TB elimination by enhan-
cing TB prevention, enabling better access to TB diagnosis
and treatment and mitigating the catastrophic TB-related
costs incurred by TB-affected households (Fig. 1) [15, 16].
The inclusion of social protection within the End TB
strategy represents a clear shift in the response to the
epidemic of TB, albeit not entirely new: since early 2006
poverty reduction initiatives have been consistently em-
bedded within the TB control strategy [17] and in the
past decade many countries have included financial sup-
port for TB patients as part of their core response to TB
[18]. The emphasis on social protection and Universal
Health Coverage has been enhanced further in the latest
End TB Strategy; however, significant unknowns remain
both in terms of the impact of cash transfer interven-
tions as well as the operational challenges associatedntion: a conceptual framework. Cash transfer interventions can
ted-costs (TB support) and reduce TB susceptibility among people at
impact on important risk factors for TB (such as under-nutrition, HIV,
ecific, TB-inclusive or TB-sensitive depending on the target population.
s diagram to provide a comparative synthesis of the current approach to
on in this framework also aims to emphasise the importance of a multi-
l approach
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first knowledge gap with a review published in 2011
[15].
In this paper we aim to address the second gap by
providing TB control implementers and other stake-
holders with an up to date overview of some key aspects
to consider when planning cash transfer interventions
as part of the national TB programme response. Much
of our operational appraisal is informed by three
resources:
a) the existing literature on cash transfers (mainly from
HIV/AIDS);
b) a more detailed appraisal of the evidence included
in our initial review [15] to investigate the extent
to which the selected cash transfer schemes could
be adopted and adapted to become useful to
support TB elimination. Specifically, interventions
were assessed through a grid of operational
questions characterising their: 1) setting; 2)
feasibility, defined as practical and ethical aspects
that make their implementation to enhance TB
prevention, care and support realistic [19]; and 3)
financial and impact sustainability (i.e. their costs
and potential for such interventions to maintain
their impact). These operational questions were
drawn from the list of criteria for the assessment
of complex public health interventions as
suggested by [20, 21]
c) Our extensive discussion over the years through
several expert consultations with policy makers and
implementers, social protection experts as well as
civil society representatives [22, 23].
In this paper - after a brief overview of the known im-
pact of cash transfers on health outcomes, including TB
- we discuss the most important issues emerged through
our operational appraisal, including: 1) approaches to
the implementation strategy; 2) the role of conditional-
ity; 3) the targeting options; and 4) sustainability, For
each of these critical areas, we provide an overview of
the most challenging aspects in the light of TB epidemi-
ology and control and identify possible interim solutions.
We conclude by drawing a roadmap for advancing the
research and the policy agenda.
Discussion
Evidence of the health impact of cash transfers
Cash transfers are already an established element of the
global response to health challenges across the world,
even if their impact on health-related outcomes has been
only partially demonstrated: several large reviews [9, 24,
25] concluded that conditional cash transfers have an
impact on improving beneficiaries health behaviours, themagnitude of which seems to vary across countries and
initiatives. The impact on health outcomes is less con-
sistent, with evidence suggesting some effect on improv-
ing nutritional status, child growth and adult morbidity
status, but not on maternal health, malaria and diar-
rhoea [24]. These results are consistent with what is also
known for HIV/AIDS: while there seems to be a positive
impact on sexual behaviours [11], the impact on actual
HIV outcome has been documented only in one study
so far [26].
With regards to TB, evidence is highly inconsistent: a
recent Cochrane review on the impact of incentives and
enablers on TB treatment adherence identified only 12
eligible trials, of which 10 took place in the US (and
mainly looking at special groups such as adolescents, in-
jection drug users, homeless and prisoners), one in
Timor-Leste and one in South Africa [27]. The review
concluded that material incentives and enablers may
have some impact on clinic attendance, but there is cur-
rently insufficient evidence to conclude if they can im-
prove long term adherence to TB treatment [27]. In
contrast, evidence from Peru [28], Brazil [29], Ecuador
[30], and Moldavia [31], showed significantly higher cure
rates among TB patients receiving financial enablers
compared to those who did not. These studies examined
the impact of cash transfers for people ill with TB. Other
studies have demonstrated, using an ecological cross-
national analytical approach, that higher national general
social protection spending is associated with lower na-
tional TB rates [32, 33].
While encouraging, a more thorough analysis of the
evidence above suggests that the use of financial incen-
tives to enhance TB prevention, care and support re-
mains fragmented, rarely formally embedded into
broader social protection schemes, and supported by a
weak and inconsistent body of evidence with large vari-
ability in the design, implementation and evaluation
strategies adopted. The weakness of impact evidence is
further exacerbated by the persisting knowledge gaps on
the operational challenges surrounding the implementa-
tion of cash interventions in the context of TB pre-
vention, care and control. Important impact and
operational lessons (mainly in terms of impact on health
seeking behaviours and need for conditionality) could
be drawn from the HIV/AIDS experience, nonetheless
significant unknowns concerning conditional cash trans-
fers remain even for HIV/AIDS including: programme de-
sign and monitoring, human rights concerns, potential for
perverse incentives; availability of supply-side complements;
and scale up, sustainability and costs [12, 13, 34, 35].
Furthermore, the use of cash transfers to enhance TB pre-
vention, care and support may present some specific chal-
lenges that may be worth exploring with a separate
operational research agenda.
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solutions
Implementation strategy
Challenges Establishing that cash transfers can effect-
ively impact TB control is only the first step in deciding
whether to, and how to, implement a cash transfer
programme. Consistently with what suggested for HIV/
AIDS [13, 35], three implementation models can be con-
ceptualised in the context of TB elimination: TB-
specific, TB-sensitive and TB-inclusive. TB-specific in-
terventions are interventions targeted at TB-affected
households/individuals with the precise intent of im-
proving a number of TB indicators. TB-sensitive inter-
ventions are interventions that can potentially affect TB
epidemiology and control by targeting people at high
risk of TB. Finally TB –inclusive are interventions in
which having TB or being a member of an household
affected by TB is one of the inclusion criteria for the
programme, albeit not the only one (Table 1). Each of
these models is characterised by a different scope,
targeting strategy, extent of integration with the local
social protection platforms, and advantages and disad-
vantages that are likely to be highly setting-specific
(Table 1).Table 1 Implementation strategies: working definitions for TB
Definition Examples
TB-
specific
initiatives
Cash transfer interventions
explicitly targeting TB-affected in-
dividuals and/or households with
the intent of addressing a specific
TB care and prevention issue [35].
ISIAT [28] and CRESIPT Project
Peru [46]
Voucher intervention in South
Africa [43, 44]
TB-
inclusive
initiatives
Cash transfer schemes that are
not limited to TB-related issues
but include TB disease amongst
their eligibility criteria.
Temporary Disability Grant in
South Africa addressing people
temporarily unable to work,
including people living with TB
disease and MDR-TB cases in
particular
TB-
sensitive
initiatives
Cash transfers interventions not
specific to TB patients but that
could have an impact for TB
patients or for TB prevention
because they target groups and/
or people at high risk of TB and
vulnerable to deeper
impoverishment due to its
consequences [35].
Bolsa Familia conditional cash
transfer scheme in Brazil that
may occasionally enrol TB
patients not because of their
health status, but because the
meet the enrolment poverty
profile applied by the
programme [41]It is likely that - as for HIV/AIDS – the most cost-
effective approach will be to adapt existing cash transfer
schemes to make them more TB-sensitive, rather than
creating or scaling up de novo programmes. However, it
remains unclear as yet how existing national TB pro-
grammes will build effective and cost-effective partner-
ship models with the institutions in charge of the design,
implementation and evaluation of governmental cash
transfer programmes.
Furthermore, the potential to implement TB-sensitive
cash transfer schemes seems to follow an “inverse care
law” pattern [36] by which most impoverished countries
highly affected by TB are least able to afford cash trans-
fer implementation or expansion to encompass TB ob-
jectives without jeopardizing existing TB health care
provision coverage or quality. For example, pilot cash
transfer schemes launched in Zambia between 2003 and
2004 [37–39], were effective in helping destitute HIV-
affected households withstand the economic impacts of
AIDS. However, these schemes have not been absorbed
into the country’s welfare system [38], may have limited
capacity for scale-up or sustainability [37] and may lack
the human and financial resources for monitoring and
evaluation. This limits the potential of these schemes toAdvantages Disadvantages
in They may represent the only
option in contexts where existing
social protection schemes have
limited resources hampering the
further expansion of their scope
(i.e. the inclusion of TB control
objectives)
They may be more suitable in
contexts where specific vulnerable
groups are involved and/or
treatment adherence support or
costs mitigations interventions are
to be prioritised
TB control programs staff may
not have the competence and
resources to manage these extra
activities
They may be perceived as
stigmatising
Same as the TB-specific initiatives
They may represent a good
compromise between TB-sensitive
and TB specific to minimise the re-
spective disadvantages
The may be still perceived as
stigmatising. Further the impact
of the intervention may be
diluted across other health
outcomes
y
They may represent the most
efficient way to optimise existing
resources
They may be the best choice in
contexts where TB incidence is
not going down despite the
good performance of the local
TB control programmes in terms
of percentage of case finding
and treatment success rates
They reduce the risk of
stigmatisation of TB-patients
Making them more inclusive for
people at risk of TB may interfere
with their performance and affect
their budget, especially in countries
where these schemes are already
run with limited resources
Government-run schemes may
be reluctant to address public
health problems as their main
objective remain fundamentally
to address poverty
Government-run schemes may
be reluctant to address TB over
other public health priorities
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care, prevention and/or support objectives.
Even in countries where comprehensive government-
led social protection programmes are in place, there may
be obstacles to make these programmes more inclusive
for TB patients. For example, South Africa has extensive
cash transfer schemes, including the Temporary Disabil-
ity Grant in which TB patients are eligible to receive
cash when unable to work. While the scheme was ini-
tially widely implemented, over the years the number of
TB patients eligible for the scheme has been reduced to
include only patients with multi-drug resistant TB
(MDR-TB) and/or severe TB-related complications [40].
The reasons for this reduction included lack of evidence
of the impact on TB care and prevention, insufficient al-
located resources to cope with the growing number of
TB-HIV co-infected patients applying for the grant, the
increasing roll-out of anti-retroviral therapy, and the an-
ecdotal reports of fraud by healthy individuals buying
sputum samples from TB patients to falsely receive a
diagnosis of TB and thus qualify to receive (or continue
to receive) the benefits [22].
A different picture emerges from Brazil. Experts of the
Bolsa Familia Programme, the Brazilian conditional cash
transfer programme for impoverished households [41],
have recently argued that, in Brazil, TB is serious enough
but also infrequent enough to incorporate TB into the
existing Bolsa Familia logistical and financial capacity,
thereby becoming more TB-inclusive or TB-sensitive
[Soares S. personal communication]. Furthermore, the
preliminary evidence of the impact of Bolsa Familia on
major public health issues, including TB, are encour-
aging [42]. Nonetheless the operational challenges of this
synergy have not yet been fully explored.
Choosing a TB-specific format may appear to be sim-
pler from an operational perspective but it may cause a
number of implementation issues in terms of manage-
ment and delivery of financial incentives from the TB
care providers. Such issues emerged from the process
evaluation of an intervention in South Africa [43]: the
trial results suggested a small, but not statistically signifi-
cant effect of the provision of vouchers on TB treatment
success rates in the intervention communities [44].
However, fidelity to the intervention was low with ap-
proximately 36 % of eligible patients not receiving any
voucher [44]. Such low fidelity was attributed mainly to
two factors: first, nurses modified the delivery of the
vouchers, mainly by arbitrarily deciding who was eligible
to receive the incentive and also rejecting the trial eligi-
bility criteria, which were perceived by the nursing staff
to be inequitable. Secondly, from the nurses’ perspective,
it was logistically easier to give all the vouchers in one
batch at the end of the month. This practical ground-
level implementation meant that some patients wereobliged to come back to the clinic more than once to
collect the voucher, a situation that was often unfavor-
able for these patients. Furthermore, the coordination of
delivery of vouchers to clinics and collection of vouchers
from local shops required considerable organization and
a dedicated staff complement [43].
Solutions In contrast to HIV/AIDS policy [35, 45], there
is insufficient evidence to advocate for the adoption of a
TB-sensitive approach over a TB-inclusive or TB-specific
approach. However, the choice between TB-sensitive,
TB-inclusive or TB-specific interventions may be guided
by a preliminary programmatic assessment of both the
TB epidemic profile and social protection environment
based on a preliminary list of questions suggested in
Table 2. This programmatic assessment should help
countries to evaluate whether the TB control objectives
can be realistically incorporated into existing schemes
and how this can be best achieved. Ideally, National TB
control programmes can have a key role in this initial as-
sessment because they are well placed to understand
how cash transfer interventions can be best tailored to
TB patients and/or people at risk for TB. Ministries of
Finance and Development may then advise on the fore-
seen issues such as the operational, financial and ethical
barriers associated with the implementation of either a
TB-sensitive or a TB-specific intervention.
Given the limited operational evidence on the feasibil-
ity of TB-sensitive cash transfer interventions it may be
more appropriate to establish initially TB-specific cash
transfer interventions run by national TB control pro-
grams and co-implemented with a governmental or non-
governmental organization, with the intent of addressing
certain TB-specific issues such as poor case-finding, low
cure rates or TB clustering in high-risk groups (e.g.
homeless, drug abusers, indigenous populations). While
the long-term objective will be most likely to move to-
wards a TB-sensitive approach, TB-specific initiatives
can still be used as a valid starting point to gain insight
and knowledge on the expected TB impact of these
interventions as well as the costs and other important
aspects to be considered when designing and imple-
menting cash transfer interventions for TB control pur-
poses (whether conditional or unconditional). An
example of TB-specific intervention is the recent evalu-
ated trial that in South Africa providing vouchers to TB
patients [43]. Another example, the CRESIPT study in
Peru, is currently under impact evaluation and sum-
marised in Table 3 [46].
Conditional vs unconditional
Challenges The effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
conditional versus unconditional cash transfer schemes
is under debate. For example, conditionality does not
Table 2 Summary of suggestions and research priorities for the operational challenges discussed
Operational
challenges
Interim solutions Research priorities
Implementation
strategy
1. Preliminary programmatic assessment of the TB-epidemiology
profile and existing social protection environment based on
structured framework including the following:
• What population group is most affected by TB?
• What are the barriers that prevent people from accessing the
TB care services and completing treatment?
• What are the socioeconomic consequences of TB and TB care
on TB affected households?
• What social protection schemes are in place? What population
group they target? What geographic areas they cover and how
they overlap with TB distribution? What is the proportion of TB
affected-individuals/households reached by these schemes
based on their enrolment criteria? How these schemes could
be made more inclusive for TB-patients?
2. Ideally start with interim, relatively small, TB-specific interventions,
aimed to address a specific TB control indicator to generate
impact evidence and operational lessons.
1. To design a programmatic assessment tool to support
countries in choosing the best implementation strategy
based on the TB epidemic profile and social protection
features.
2. To undertake an inventory of all existing social protection
initiatives somehow linked or linkable to TB control run at
governmental and non-governmental level, then to identify
the most promising initiatives to undergo impact and
operational evaluation.
3. To create a network of impact and process evaluations from
different countries so to have an overview of what works,
where and why and share methodological and programmatic
lessons. This could require approach, prioritising first TB-specific
initiatives and natural experiments or quasi-experimental
methods.
4. To develop and apply metrics to measure economic impact
of TB for households
5. To develop innovative and rapid impact evaluation
techniques, including mathematical modelling.
Conditional vs
Unconditional
1. Undertake qualitative studies among intervention recipients to
access the appropriateness of the conditions proposed and
potential barriers to compliance.
2. If strict conditionality is deemed unfeasible or
counterproductive, attempt the use of “soft” forms of
conditionality.
• Do not reduce the transfer size or decline eligibility only after
several months of non-compliance with the behavioural
requirements.
• Do apply conditionality only for behaviour requirements that
are simple to meet (i.e. attending TB education workshops).
1. Identify key TB-control related behaviours that are more likely
to be affected by the use of conditionalities.
2. Explore if and how conditionality compliance is influenced by
the size of cash transfer, the frequency of cash transfers, other
psychosocial and behavioural determinants, TB status and
stage of disease.
3. Identify strategies to effectively and cost-effectively monitor-
ing these conditionalities.
Targeting
approach
They are likely to differ depending on settings. Use multiple
criteria based on poverty criteria and a risk score for TB.
1. Verify targeting accuracy through qualitative assessment and
TB surveys among the cash recipients;
2. Assess the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of different
targeting strategies;
Sustainability Identify multiple donors, domestic and international, addressing
specific costs of the intervention.
1. Extended cost-effective analysis (ECEA) to evaluate costs
against TB costs mitigation at household, community and
country level
2. Explore co-financing mechanisms
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47]. Furthermore, the implementation of conditionality
to achieve public health objectives, including those re-
lated to TB programmes, may be hampered by existing
administrative and health system weaknesses. Therefore,
cash transfer programme interventions may not have the
financial or administrative capacities to monitor the
health-seeking behaviour conditionality or offer adequate
health systems infrastructures to make these conditions
feasible or ethical [6, 48–50]. For example, in settings
with limited TB care services, implementing conditional
cash transfer schemes to improve treatment TB adher-
ence may have limited impact if treatment or access to
treatment is not consistently available.
Conditionality may also raise important questions con-
cerning choice, autonomy and decisional capacity of the
poor without due flexibility determined by cultural and
socioeconomic factors [48]. Conditionality may stimulate
poor people to seek TB care while neglecting other im-
portant health priorities in the household such asmaternal/child health or to act against their common be-
lief or will [51, 52]. Evidence concerning this is incon-
sistent: the low uptake of the Janani Suraksha Yojani
programme in India among the poorest and least edu-
cated women demonstrates that conditioning the cash
transfers do not necessarily overcome cultural or geo-
graphical barriers that hamper people’s capacity to meet
behavioural conditions [14]. Conversely, in Malawi,
monetary incentives of less than a tenth of a day’s wage
dramatically changed people’s health seeking behaviours
by compensating the psychological and economic costs
of HIV testing and reduced the gender gap in accessing
HIV services [53]. Thus, cash incentives or enablers for
seeking TB care may compensate for the direct material
and the indirect psychological costs of TB diagnosis and
ultimately increase gender equity in access to TB diag-
nosis [53]. In conclusion: a) There is currently no direct,
rigorous evidence to guide to guide the circumstances
under which TB-related cash transfer interventions
should be conditional and if so, on what TB-related
Table 3 An example of TB-specific cash transfer intervention:
the CRESIPT study in Peru [46]
An example of a TB-specific cash transfer program was the ISIAT
(Innovative Socioeconomic Interventions Against TB) project in Peru,
which offered an integrated multidisciplinary community and household
socio-economic intervention to TB-affected households, including food
and cash transfers, microcredit, microenterprise and vocational training
[28]. The results of this pilot study have informed the design of the
subsequent 6-year CRESIPT (Community Randomized Evaluation of a
Socio-economic Intervention to Prevent Tuberculosis) project, a commu-
nity randomised study. CRESIPT aims to provide rigorous evidence of the
impact of integrated social support and conditional cash transfers on:
sustained cure in TB patients; prevention of TB in household contacts; and
TB rates in the wider community. CRESIPT is being preceded by an on-
going pilot phase to implement and refine the complex socioeconomic
intervention in 32 communities, assess its impact on TB chemoprophylaxis
completion, and assess its acceptance through a process evaluation.
Through engagement with participants, the national TB program and a
civil society of ex-TB patients, the CRESIPT pilot developed its condi-
tional cash transfer scheme with amounts that were perceived to be
too small to affect participants’ autonomy in decision-making and large
enough to reduce poverty-related TB risk factors [65]. Conditional cash
transfers were provided to patient households for: i. screening for TB in
household contacts and MDR-TB in patients; ii. adhering to TB treatment
and chemoprophylaxis; and iii. engaging with CRESIPT social activities
(household visits and participatory community meetings consisting of
educational workshops and TB Clubs). A patient with non-MDR TB
receiving six months of anti-TB treatment and completing all conditions
optimally could receive cash transfers up to a value of US$ 230.
TB-affected households participating in the intervention received an
average of US$ 183 over the course of treatment for the compliance to
the conditional requirements. This amount aimed to be similar to, and
thus potentially mitigate, the average TB-affected households’ direct
costs of “free” TB care (i.e. TB-related costs of additional food, transport,
medicines, and clinical consultations equalling approximately 10 % of an
average household’s annual income). The cost of the CRESIPT pilot’s
socioeconomic intervention were <10 % of overall costs of treating a TB
patient with non-MDR TB in the local Peruvian setting (WHO 2014
http://www.who.int/tb/dots/planning_budgeting_tool/overview.pdf).
Expert opinion suggested that an intervention that increased a National
TB Programme’s budget by 50 % and led to a 33 % reduction in TB inci-
dence would likely be adopted by governments [71, 72]. The CRESIPT pilot
cash transfer intervention cost considerably less than 50 % of the per pa-
tient national TB budget, even including project staff.
An impact assessment to evaluate the effect of the CRESIPT pilot
intervention on equitable access to TB treatment and prevention
demonstrated improvement in treatment outcomes for patients and
uptake of TB preventive therapy for the TB patients’ household
members [73]. A process evaluation of the pilot suggested that: the
project is likely to be sustainable due to involvement of patients and
ex-patients as facilitators; there has been effective and synergistic
cross-sectoral collaboration with the National TB Programme; and there
is a perception from participants that the conditional cash transfers
were patient-centred and empowering, especially for women. On the
other hand the preliminary results of the process evaluation have
shown challenges including: hidden bank charges and delays in cash
transfers eroding participants’ confidence; conditional cash transfers
requiring all household members to participate being poorly achieved;
and high risk patients (e.g. the formerly incarcerated, the homeless, and
those with drug or alcohol addiction) being difficult to engage and
thus benefiting least from the intervention.
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stringently. b) Even evidence from the HIV/AIDS experi-
ence is not conclusive and the issue has not yet been
rigorously explored [13]. Finally, c) the effectiveness of
utilizing conditionality in cash transfers depends on theoutcome under evaluation, the feasibility of the condi-
tion, the program context, and the target population
[34, 54, 55].Solutions Given the numerous knowledge gaps, the
strict application of conditionality to increase TB case
detection and treatment success rate may be unjustified
in countries with limited administrative and health care
capacities. In these settings, an option may be a “soft”
form of conditionality in which conditions are simple or
made less stringent (e.g. penalties for non-adherence do
not imply the exclusion of participants from the
programme) [48, 55]. Another possibility may be to in-
directly encourage the attendance of TB care services by
making the cash transfer conditional upon the attend-
ance of workshops and training sessions concerning TB
that may help TB-affected families to overcome the fear
and the stigma of approaching the TB services.
Should conditionality be deemed appropriate, it may
be useful to assess the features of the local TB epidemic
and available care. This may be accomplished with quali-
tative research with TB-affected families and main TB
stake-holders to test the feasibility and acceptability of
conditionalities from the target population and to design
them so to meet better the specific challenges experi-
enced by TB-affected families.Targeting approach
Challenges Cash transfer programs may be made TB-
sensitive by targeting people at high risk of TB, or may
be transformed to TB-inclusive programs by specifically
including TB patients among their target population.
These programs may broadly target TB-patients and/or
their households; restrict their target to TB-patients sub-
groups (e.g. drug-resistant TB, TB-HIV co-infected or
TB patients affected by other co-morbidities such as
mental health issues or diabetes); or restrict to TB-
patients during their highest risk time period (e.g. the
time period when treatment loss to follow up or onward
TB transmission is most likely).
Depending on the targeting strategy, issues concerning
accuracy, costs, cost-effectiveness, equity, fairness, sus-
tainability, unintended consequences and stigma may
arise: for instance, using TB as a targeting criterion may
be more efficient, but could be stigmatising. Further-
more, it may foster perverse incentives in which patients
attempt to remain sick assuming that this may entitle
them to receive the cash benefits. This concern was spe-
cifically raised by TB care providers in the intervention
from Lutge et al. [43], although this was not observed
and conversely patients receiving vouchers more often
tended to be more likely to achieve treatment success
[44].
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criteria, may be inefficient or impractical. For example, a
2010 analysis in Brazil cross-linking the national TB
registry with the Single Registry for Social Programmes
(a census database to identify people enrolled in social
protection programmes in Brazil) showed that only one
fourth of TB patients who live below the poverty line are
already enrolled in government’s social protection pro-
grammes, with only 14 % of them being amongst the
beneficiaries of Bolsa Familia. This unexpectedly low
overlap between the two data sources suggest that in
Brazil targeting based only on socioeconomic criteria
may be insufficient to capture most TB patients in needs
of social protection for a number of reasons discussed
by Torrens and colleagues [29]. Moreover, even if such
poor families are enrolled in Bolsa Familia, it is often the
case that they do not have the necessary requirements to
actually receive the transfers (e.g. a billing address,
identification documents, or proof of income docu-
ments) [29, 56]. In contrast, in Zambia targeting for
vulnerability to HIV based on poverty levels may be
considered a viable option to also capture a substantial
proportion of households affected by TB as well as
HIV that are in need of financial support that avoids
stigmatisation [38].
Solutions There is very limited evidence to inform the
best targeting strategy for cash transfer interventions
aiming at enhancing TB elimination; however the most
suitable approach seems to be highly setting-specific and
pretty much dependant on the TB issues to be ad-
dressed. For example, in high-TB burden countries pre-
venting TB transmission may require targeting people at
high-risk for TB; on the other hand, in settings where
TB priorities are more circumscribed (i.e. addressing
TB-related catastrophic costs, enhancing TB treatment
adherence), and/or the epidemic is restricted to selected
groups of the population (i.e. drug users, homeless, pris-
oners) then it may be more beneficial to target directly
TB-affected households or TB patients.
As a general rule, cash transfer interventions, and
more broadly social protection initiatives, should be de-
livered in way to be non-stigmatising, non-
discriminatory and aim to optimise inclusiveness and
equity [35]. In order to achieve this ultimate goal, coun-
ties are often encouraged to use multiple criteria [48]
such as multidimensional targeting that identifies benefi-
ciaries based on the objectives of the intervention and
various forms of deprivation affecting the target popula-
tion [57]. In the case of TB-sensitive or TB-inclusive
cash transfer intervention, a multiple targeting strategy
could include a combination of the following criteria: A.
living in extreme poverty as assessed by econometric or
asset-based indices; B. not having household membersable to work; C. not having other forms of social assist-
ance; and D. the household TB history or a high house-
hold risk score based on TB risk factors (such as
household prevalence of HIV, alcohol abuse, smoking,
diabetes) [48].
Sustainability
Challenges Data concerning existing cash transfers
costs are limited, not always comprehensive, and lacking
for low compared to middle income countries. Where
available, evidence suggests an average cost between
12.5 US$ and 26.5 US$ per month per beneficiary (with
4 to 20 % of the monthly household consumption ex-
penditure of the beneficiaries covered), which represents
from 0.36 to 1.54 % of GDP for any given implementing
country [24, 58]. Analyses of costs of social protection
packages generally conclude that social protection is af-
fordable in most countries, including deprived settings
such as Sub Saharan low income countries, as long as
costs are less than 1 % of countries’ GDP share [58, 59].
In Zambia, for example, the annual costs of the three
pilot studies for the national unconditional cash transfer
were US$40-$82 million [38]. A 2009 analysis showed
that even if a pilot in the Katete district was expanded
throughout the country to target 450,000 beneficiaries
with transfers of an average of US $15/month, this
would represent only 2.4 % of the Zambian National
budget or 0.7 % of the GDP in 2007 [38]. These data
suggest that implementing the Social Cash Transfer
scheme on a national scale in Zambia is likely to be af-
fordable. However public spending in Zambia on social
assistance represents <0.1 % of GDP [38] suggesting that
scaling up the Social Transfer Scheme across the coun-
try requires increased financial investment, but also pol-
itical will [37].
It remains also unclear whether economic assessments
should distinguish between different types of costs (e.g.
administrative versus transfer costs) as well as distin-
guish between programs supported by aid provided by
international donors versus domestic funding. Generally,
government-led schemes are considered to have greater
long-term sustainability [37, 38]. However, it is not yet
clear how many government-led cash transfer programs
may have the financial and logistic resources to sustain-
ably encompass specific public health objectives, such as
TB [60]. The incorporation of TB beneficiaries in exist-
ing cash transfer initiatives or linking them with TB
activities is likely in fact to require additional costs for
setting up new operating procedures, staff training and
the creation of new collaborative forms of social and
medical management. Countries may not be able to af-
ford these costs without mobilizing extra-funds. In these
circumstances, funding sources may be hesitant to spon-
sor collaborative projects if these payments may
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ginal programme [60].
Solutions Cost concerns are legitimate; Referring to TB
specifically, globally there are about 9 million new cases
of TB each year. Hypothetically, even if $100 worth of
social protection were to be additionally provided to
every patient globally then the resultant expense of
would be approximately $900 million. This is not a
modest expense in the current global TB investments.
However, costs should be evaluated through a proper
extended cost-effectiveness analysis (ECEA), which ac-
counts not just for the health gain against the cost of an
interventions, but also the financial protection achieved
as a result of that intervention (both in terms of poverty
aversion and equity improvement) [61, 62]. In the case
of TB, the potential financial benefit arising from proper
control measures seems considerable: ecological studies
have reported an effect of 0.2–0.4 % decreased economic
growth for every 10 % higher TB incidence [63]. This
corresponds to an annual loss of US$1.4-2.8 billion in
economic growth worldwide. In addition, the World
Bank estimates that loss of productivity attributable to
TB is 4-7 % of some countries' GDP [61]. In a more re-
cent study, Verguet and colleagues have positioned TB
treatment among the best interventions at preventing
medical impoverishment (i.e. 96 cases of poverty averted
per every US$100,000 spent) [62].
At the micro-level the impact of cash transfers is ex-
pected to be even more significant: in most settings the
average costs encountered by TB sufferers exceed 10 %
annual household expenditures [64]. In worst cases this
burden can exceed 20 %, a threshold that has been de-
fined as “catastrophic” not only because associated with
a further impoverishment of TB-affected households,
but also associated with an increased risk of TB mortal-
ity, treatment loss to follow up, or TB recurrence [65].
Cash transfers can reduce financial vulnerability and po-
tentially improve TB treatment adherence and outcome
[65]. Furthermore, it should be considered that even TB-
specific cash transfer interventions are likely to achieve
multiple health and development impacts, not just TB
[12, 65]. The capacity to produce multiple benefits is the
strongest argument to propose co-financing mechanisms
through which various sectors pool funds or engage in
joint budgeting to fund interventions with multi-sectoral
benefits [12, 66]. Under this approach several models
have been proposed: one may be to consider the TB-
related costs separately from the core services of the
original intervention. International and/or domestic do-
nors may be willing to specifically cover these marginal
TB-related costs [18, 66, 67]. Alternatively it may be
worth exploring the creation of a partnership among do-
nors as theorised in the UNAIDS Investment frameworkto realise health and development funding synergies
[68].
A research road map for the future
The research priority actions to support and inform the
new End TB strategy are listed in Table 2 and sum-
marised here.
A significant scientific and financial investment is ur-
gently needed to fill knowledge gaps, the most important
of which is whether cash transfers can enhance the ac-
complishment of the goals and targets of the new End
TB strategy. Impact and operational evidence can be
generated both by: i) replicating TB-specific initiatives
such as CRESIPT in different settings with the objective
of creating a network of projects sharing methodological
and programmatic lessons, and ii) undertaking quasi-
experimental as well as natural experiments to under-
stand what is the unintentional impact of cash transfer
interventions on TB epidemiology. This latter approach
is heavily dependent on the possibility of linking TB and
cash transfer interventions datasets. Alternatively, appro-
priate proxies or biomarkers for TB and other respira-
tory infections could be identified in future to replace
the actual measurement of TB indicators to determine
whether a tangible impact on these indicators can be ob-
served and - if so - how much this could be attributed
to the intervention.
The first and second approach can collectively contrib-
ute to inform the design of more effective and cost-
effective TB-sensitive cash transfer interventions. The
pathway towards TB-sensitive interventions may also
benefit from: i) the development of a programmatic as-
sessment tool for countries to map the existing social
protection platforms and to inform the decision on
which implementation strategy, TB-specific, TB-inclusive
or TB-sensitive, may be the most suitable in their own
context given the local social protection and TB epi-
demic conditions; ii) the inventory or mapping of exist-
ing cash transfer initiatives and assessment of the extent
for potential overlap with TB control activities with the
ultimate aim to identify the most promising initiatives
that could be most effectively and cost-effectively
adapted to meet TB control objectives; iii) the develop-
ment of metrics to measure economic impact of TB for
households [69, 70]; and iv) the development of rapid
and relatively inexpensive assessment methods such as
mathematical modelling techniques to predict the effect-
iveness and cost-effectiveness of a given intervention
under different operational conditions and after control-
ling for local TB and socioeconomic trends.
To inform the new End TB strategy, research studies
need to go beyond the evaluation of costs and provide a
more in depth understanding of critical operational as-
pects. Ad hoc studies should be undertaken to assess the
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as: what are the determinants of success of conditional-
ity? Is the compliance to conditionality influenced by the
cash transfer size, frequency of delivery and other psy-
chosocial determinants? Does the TB status (i.e. sensitive
or drug-resistant TB, loss to follow up or relapse case)
as well as the stage of disease (TB infection, disease)
affect the success of conditionality? How do we effect-
ively and cost-effectively monitor conditionality?
Efforts should be made to understand the relative
advantage of different targeting strategies and to assess
the accuracy of targeting. Finally a thorough assess-
ment of costs and the identification of innovative fund-
ing mechanisms seem important to justify sustainable
investments in cash transfer interventions for ending
TB.Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed four major operational
aspects to consider if implementing cash transfer inter-
ventions as part of a country TB response, including
programme design, conditionality, targeting and sustain-
ability. Most of these challenges apply to all cash transfer
interventions, but we appraised them through the lens
of TB epidemiology and control. By doing so we aimed
to foster discussion and stimulate research in this field
within the TB scientific community. We took a broad
approach but have not covered certain important aspects
such as the ethical dimension of using cash incentives
for health promotion purposes; however this paper has
the potential to represent a useful entry point for TB
control implementers and researchers to introduce them
to new concepts and definitions and the discourse on
cash transfer interventions.
Our paper demonstrates that there are important les-
sons that can be inferred from the literature and usefully
– albeit provisionally – applied to TB. However crucial
knowledge gaps remain that can be only partially in-
ferred from the increasing experience gained from cash
transfer initiatives implemented for other diseases such
as HIV/AIDS.
While the formulation of formal policy recommenda-
tions is premature at this stage, this does not justify
inaction or complacency. A clear research agenda is
needed to inform and support the End TB strategy; how-
ever, equally important will be the political commitment
and the financial support of all the key stakeholders to-
wards this goal.Abbreviations
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